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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that the retirement of corporate bonds at a discount does not create
assessable gain. In the instant case, which is a reversal upon both
logical and statutory 6 grounds of the position taken by the Board,
the Supreme Court has pointed out that its decision in the Bowers
case was prompted by the equitable consideration that the transac-
tion, as a whole, resulted in a loss to the debtor.7 Similar reasons
of equity will undoubtedly influence the Supreme Court to uphold
the Board in its contention, likewise founded upon the Bowers case,
that the cancellation of the indebtedness of an insolvent firm by agree-
ment of creditors does not make for taxable income.8 The signifi-
cance of the present case lies rather in the indication of the applica-
bility of equitable principles in determining taxable profits than in
any explanation of the scope of a definition.
J.L.
INCOME TAx-SALE OF UNIDENTIFIED SECURITIES-DETERMI-
NATION OF TAXABLE GAIN.-During 1924 and 1925, petitioner had
been dealing on margin in the stock of the United Gas Improvement
Company. In the latter year, his margin repeatedly fell below the
agreed percentage and sales of the stock were thereupon made by
his brokers. The petitioner, in his 1925 tax returns, set off these
sales against his 1925 purchases, thereby showing a loss. The Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, claiming that such sales should be
set off against the earliest 1924 purchases, declared a taxable profit.
Upon affirmance of the Commissioner's ruling by the Board of Tax
Appeals, the case was brought by the taxpayer to the Circuit Court
of Appeals. Held, that the amount of profit or loss resulting from
the sale of unidentified securities is determined by charging such
'U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, Art. 545 (1) (c) (applying to 1921 Rev. Act):
"If, however, the corporation purchases and retires any of such bonds at a
price less than the issuing price or face value, the excess of the issuing price
or face value over the purchase price is gain or income for the taxable year."
See Art. 544 (1) (c) of Reg. 45 (Revenue Act of 1918) ; Art. 545 (1) (c)
of Reg. 65 (Revenue Act of 1924); Art. 545 (1) (c) of Reg. 69 (Revenue
Act of 1926) ; Art. 68 (1) (c) of Reg. 74 (Revenue Act of 1928).
"In his dissenting opinion in the National Sugar Mfg. Co. case, supra
note 4 at p. 578, Mr. Sternhagen declared, "* * * but the court was undoubt-
edly influenced to a substantial extent by the equitable consideration that, at
the time the tax was sought to be imposed, 'the result of the whole transaction
was a loss, and the fact that the borrowed money was lost, and that the excess
of such loss over income was more than the amount borrowed.' The opinion
concludes with the statement that 'the mere diminution of loss is not gain,
profit or income.' This is far from saying that the diminution of liability in
a going business is not gain, and I can not believe that the Supreme Court
intended to .have its decision so understood."8 Simmons Gin Company v. Comm., 16 B. T. A. 793 (1929); Progress
Paper Co. v. Comm., 20 B. T. A. 234 (1930).
TAX COMMENT
sale against the earliest purchase of the stock. John A. Snyder v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 54 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1931).
The Federal Revenue Acts declare that the taxable income or
deductible loss resulting from the sale of personal property is to be
determined by comparison of the selling price with the cost, statu-
torily termed the basis.1 In the simplest form of transaction, the
formula is mechanically applicable, but in the more complex dis-
positions of property, the determination of the basis often presents
special difficulties. 2  Where, as in the instant case, an unidentified
portion of a stock issue is sold, the consistently maintained position
of the government has been that the basis is the cost to the seller
of the earliest purchase of the stock.3 Under no circumstances may
the average cost of all the stock be employed as the basis.4 But
where securities upon which a stock dividend has been declared are
sold, an exception to the rule against averaging is presented.5 This
deviation from the rule is explainel by the courts upon the theory
that the distribution of a stock dividend merely substitutes a larger
number of shares for a smaller without effecting any alteration of
the recipient's interest in the corporation. 6 In the instances of the
acquisition of securities by bequest 7 or gift,s the difficulties pre-
Sections 111(a) and 113, REv. AT of 1928; sections 202(a) and 204(a),
REV. ACT of 1926. See Merchants' Loan and Trust Company v. Smietanka, 255
U. S. 509, 41 Sup. Ct. 386 (1921) ; Walsh v. Brewster, 255 U. S. 536, 41 Sup.
Ct. 392 (1921); U. S. v. Siegel, 52 F. (2d) 63 (C. C. A. Mo. 1931).
'See KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1929) chapters 13 and 26.
'ART. 39 of REG. 69, REV. AT of 1926: "When shares of stock in a cor-
poration are sold from lots purchased at different dates and at different prices
and the identity of the lots cannot be determined, the stock sold shall be
charged against the earliest purchases of such stock. The excess of the amount
realized on the sale over the cost or other basis of the stock will constitute
gain"; Towne v. McElligott, 274 Fed. 960 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Executors
of Skinner v. Eaton, 34 F. (2d) 575 (D. C. Conn. 1929) ; Howbert v. Penrose,
38 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930). See Appeals of George W. Megeath
et al., 5 B. T. A. 1274 (1927) ; David Stewart v. Commissioner of Int. Rev.,
17 B. T. A. 604 (1929) ; Western Bank and Trust Co. v. Comm. of Int. Rev.,
19 B. T. A. 401 (1930).
'See KLEiN, op. cit. supra, at p. 346.
Appeal of Fuller, 4 B. T. A. 992 (1926); George L. DeBlois et al. v.
Comm. of Int. Rev., 12 B. T. A. 1138 (1928).
1 See cases, supra note 5; Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158
(1918); Towne v. McElligott, supra note 3. In Appeal of Cowden, 3 B. T. A.
816 (1926) at p. 817, the court says, "The only result of the declaration and
distribution of the stock dividend was that each of the taxpayers, in common
with all other stockholders, had a larger number of shares evincing his owner-
ship of unchanged interest in the assets of the corporation. It follows, there-
fore, that the cost of each share, either before or after the distribution of the
stock dividend, must be found by dividing the cost of all by the whole number
of shares involved." See 1 Cum. Bull. 30; 2 Cum. Bull. 26.7 Section 113(a) (5), REv. ACT of 1928; Section 204(a) (5); Brewster
v. Gage, 25 F. (2d) 915 (W. D. N. Y. 1927). See Moser v. Comm. of Int.
Rev., 12 B. T. A. 672 (1928).
' Section 113(a) (4) REv. AT of 1928; section 204(a) (4) REV. ACT
of 1926.
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sented are met by the governmental ruling that the fair market value
at the time of acquisition shall constitute the basis. The decision
in the present case is a lucid exposition of the logic inherent in a
ruling which, at first glance, may appear somewhat arbitrary.
J. L.
ESTATE TAX, TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY.-Appellee sought to
recover Federal Estate taxes paid upon thirteen items of property,
real and personal, held by the testator and his wife as tenants by the
entirety. As to those items of property held upon tenancies by the
entirety created after the effective date of the Revenue Act of 1924,
it was conceded that the tax was rightfully assessed; but as to those
items of property held uporq, tenancies by the entirety created after
the Revenue Act of 1916 and before the effective date of the Revenue
Act of 1924, it was contended that the statute is arbitrarily retro-
active. The government argued that the tax is laid upon rights de-
volving upon the wife at the death of her husband after the passage
of the act, and that the statute is therefore not applied retroactively.
Held, The tax was validly assessed. Pillips v. Dime Trust & Safe
Deposit Co., 283 U. S. 795, 52 Sup. Ct. 46 (1931).
The Supreme Court has recently held that the interest of the
surviving tenant may be subjected to an estate tax,' reasoning that
"The death of one of the parties to the tenancy became the gener-
ating source of important and definite accessions to the property
rights of the other." 2 Disregarding the common law fiction of hus-
band and wife unity it is at once apparent that the surviving tenant
whose rights had formerly been hedged in on all sides has now ac-
quired sole proprietorship of the property.
A transfer tax levied on a donor in respect to absolute gifts
made inter vivos has been held to be invalid.3 Here technical title,
power to recall, and beneficial use and enjoyment had all passed out
of the settlor prior to the enactment of the applicable taxing sec-
tions. But, where the settlor reserves the right during his life to
alter the terms of the trust,4 or to revoke the trust 5 the tax has been
held not to be retroactive within the condemnation of the Fifth
'Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (1930); (1930) 5 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 135.
'Supra note 1, at p. 504, 50 Sup. Ct. at 359.
'Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710 (1927) ; Blodgett v.
Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 105 (1927); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276
U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 353 (1928); Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582, 51 Sup.
Ct. 306 (1931).
' Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225 (1927).
' Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1928);
(1929) 42 HARV. L. Rlv. 833.
